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Abstract
In a set-up with intermediate production, we analyze how a ship-
per￿ s choice of transport technology, traditional versus modern, inter-
acts with the mode of foreign expansion by an service ￿rm, export
versus foreign direct investment (FDI). In terms of the mode of for-
eign expansion by the service ￿rm, we obtain that: due to trade in
intermediate goods, trade and FDI can be complements; the export
strategy dominates when the economies of scale at plant level are high
and trade costs are low; the FDI strategy is preferable when market
size is large and trade costs are intermediate. In what concerns the
choice of transport technology by the shipper, we ￿nd that: the mod-
ern technology tends to be implemented in larger markets; economic
integration can encourage the adoption of modern technology vis-￿-
vis the traditional one; the modern technology adoption is more likely
for intermediate levels of transport costs. We then have that modern
technology adoption usually occurs under the FDI strategy, since both
emerge when trade costs are intermediate and market size is large.
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11 Introduction
The literature in international trade and economic geography emphasizes
the role of trade costs for economic outcomes, such as trade patterns (Krug-
man, 1980), location of industry (Krugman, 1991) and multinational activity
(Horstmann and Markusen, 1992). In these models, trade costs for example
give rise to the well known home market e⁄ects, agglomeration e⁄ects and
the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄, respectively1. In addition, the em-
pirical evidence shows that trade costs, transportation technology and the
transportation sector play a major role for economic exchange (see amongst
others Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001; Combes and Lafourcade, 2005; Head and
Mayer, 2004; Sjostrom, 2004 and Teixeira, 2006). In spite of this important
role, transportation has mostly been left in the background of the theoretical
analyses. In fact, Paul Samuelson￿ s (1954) seminal formalization of trade
costs, the well known iceberg trade costs, was introduced to avoid precisely
dealing directly with the transport sector.
Recently, though, there has been a growing interest on the issues related
to transportation. This is the case with for example Mori and Nishikimi
(2002), Behrens et al. (2006, 2009), Behrens and Picard (2010) and Taka-
hashi (2006). The common topic linking these papers is the relation between
transport costs and the location of economic activity. For instance, Mori
and Nishikimi (2002) and Behrens et al. (2006) analyze the role of density
economies for transport costs. Behrens et al. (2009) and Behrens and Picard
(2010) endogenize transport cost rates in a spatial economy. In turn, Taka-
hashi (2006) studies the interdependence between the choice of transport
technology and economic geography.
In this paper, we follow Takahashi (2006) by focusing on a shipper￿ s choice
of transport technology, modern versus traditional. However, contrary to
Takahashi (2006) as well as to the others papers previously mentioned, our
main concern is not economic geography but rather to analyze how transport
1The home market e⁄ect states that, due to trade costs and increasing returns to scale,
countries with a higher share of the world￿ s demand tend to have a disproportionately
larger share of the world￿ s industry than of the world￿ s demand (Krugman, 1980). Conse-
quently, as trade costs decrease, agglomeration e⁄ects can be triggered in the larger regions
conducing to core-periphery spatial patterns (Krugman, 1991). In turn, the proximity-
concentration trade-o⁄ (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) says that when a ￿rm decides
on the mode of foreign expansion, export versus multinational, it weights the bene￿ts of
concentrating production in one location (economies of scale) against the advantages of
being closer to consumers (avoid trade costs).
2technology is a⁄ected by the mode chosen by the service sector to serve the
foreign market: export versus foreign direct investment (FDI).
To accomplish this, we develop a model with two players: a monopolist
service ￿rm and a shipper. The economy has two locations: the monopolist
headquarters and a foreign (city) market where all the ￿nal demand is lo-
cated. We adopt the export-FDI formalization with intermediate goods by
Pontes (2007)2. In particular, the monopolist service ￿rm produces a ￿nal
good using an intermediate good as input. Following the literature on FDI
(see Carr et al., 2001), the intermediate good can be seen as ￿rm-speci￿c
knowledge assets (like blue-prints, patents and tacit knowledge) that need to
be pass onto the ￿nal product. We can think, for example, that the interme-
diate good is training given by a ￿rm￿ s expert to the ￿rms￿workers. In turn,
the ￿nal good is a consumption private service good.
The intermediate good can only be produced in the monopolist headquar-
ters, but the ￿nal good can be produced in the monopolist headquarters or
in the foreign market. The monopolist has to decide whether to serve the
foreign market via exports or FDI. In the export strategy, the ￿nal good is
produced in the monopolist headquarters, while in the FDI strategy the ￿nal
good is produced in the destination market.
In the export case, a ￿rm￿ s expert gives training to the ￿rm￿ s employees in
the headquarters and then they are exported to the foreign market every time
the ￿rm supplies a service there. In the FDI case, instead, a ￿rm￿ s expert
is exported to the foreign market to give training to the ￿rm￿ s workers that
are employed in the foreign subsidiary. These employees, in turn, supply the
￿rm￿ s service to consumers in the destination market. Both cases are quite
common, for instance, with ￿nancial and consulting ￿rms.
In turn, the shipper has to choose whether to supply the market with a
traditional or a modern technology3. The di⁄erence between the two tech-
2Although the focus of the FDI literature has been the manufacturing sector, there is
also a substantial analysis of FDI in the service sector using a very similar framework to
the one used for the manufacturing sector (see Markusen and Strand, 2009; Francois and
Hoekman, 2010). In fact, Ramasamy and Yeung (2010) show evidence that the standard
FDI models (like Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) can also be applied to FDI in the service
sector, i.e.: no new theories are necessary to explain the determinants of services FDI (see
also Brown and Stern, 2001, Buch and Lipponer, 2007, Moshirian, 2004, Ruckman, 2004).
Furthermore, as shown by the World Investment Report 2004, the structure of foreign
direct investment (FDI) has shifted towards services. All of the above justi￿es our choice
of the modeling strategy in this paper.
3In this sense, we analyze the provision of transport services at the regional or interna-
3nologies is that the traditional technology has higher marginal costs and lower
￿xed costs than the modern technology. In this sense, the main characteristic
of the modern technology is that it is subject to increasing returns to scale4.
In terms of the mode of foreign expansion by the service ￿rm, we have
that the service ￿rm only chooses to serve the foreign market (with the ex-
port or the FDI strategy) at relatively low transport costs. In addition,
as in Horstmann and Markusen (1992), the usual trade-o⁄ between concen-
tration and proximity arises in the decision of the monopolist service ￿rm.
In particular, while the export strategy is preferred when the economies of
scale at the plant level are high and transport costs are low (concentration),
the FDI strategy is favored when market size is large and trade costs are
intermediate (proximity). However, contrary to Horstmann and Markusen
(1992), but in line with Pontes (2007), due to intermediate consumption,
FDI does not necessarily eliminate exports. In other words, FDI and exports
need not be substitutes, since under FDI, international trade continues to
arise due to the exports of intermediate goods (i.e.: FDI and exports can be
complements). This result has two advantages: ￿rst, our model mirrors bet-
ter the real world than standard horizontal FDI models such as Horstmann
and Markusen (1992), since the data show that FDI and exports tend to be
complements (see Markusen, 2002); second the demand for transportation
under FDI is positive (and not zero as is the case when FDI and exports are
substitutes)5.
tional level, i.e.: inter-city transport infrastructure but not intra-city. Larch (2007) show
evidence of the growing importance of the multinationalization of the transport sector.
For the study of intra-city (urban) transport infrastructure, see Zenou (2000, 2011).
4The metaphor modern versus traditional does not need to be read literally. We can
instead think of an established transport technology (which can be hi-tech or not) and a
new technology, where for the former the ￿xed costs have already been incurred, but the
same is not the case for the latter.
5Horizontal FDI occurs when production takes place in the ￿nal destination. The other
type of FDI usually considered in the literature is vertical FDI. Vertical FDI emerges when
a ￿rm has di⁄erent stages of production in di⁄erent countries (for instance, design at home
and production at foreign). As we have just discussed, horizontal FDI is motivated by
the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄. In turn, vertical FDI tends to be motivated by cost
reasons (for example, considering that production is labor intensive then it is more cost
e⁄ective to delocalize production to a labor abundant country). In this sense, our model
is a hybrid of horizontal and vertical FDI. This is so, because while in our framework the
motives for FDI are the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ from horizontal FDI models,
the type of FDI we are considering involves the delocalization of one stage of production
like in vertical FDI models.
4The latter feature is central in a set-up like ours that aims to analyze
the choice of transport technology. In fact, if FDI and trade are substitutes,
the demand for transportation when the monopolist chooses the FDI strategy
would be zero, given that there is no trade. As a consequence, under the FDI
equilibrium, the shipper would never adopt the modern technology, since it
could not pay for the modern technology￿ s ￿xed cost. On the contrary, if
FDI and trade are complements, even under the FDI regime the shipper can
choose between the modern and the traditional technology, since interna-
tional trade in intermediate production creates a demand for transportation.
Accordingly, it might then be possible for the shipper to pay for the modern
technology￿ s ￿xed cost.
In what concerns the shipper￿ s choice of transport technology, we obtain
three main results. First, the modern technology tends to be implemented
in larger markets. This is so, given that a larger market size reduces the
￿xed costs per capita of the modern technology, making its adoption more
attractive relatively to the traditional one. Second, economic integration
may encourage the adoption of the modern technology vis-￿-vis the tradi-
tional one. The rationale for this is that closer economic integration increases
trade, thereby allowing the shipper to pay for the higher ￿xed costs of the
modern technology. Third, the relation between transport costs and mod-
ern technology adoption is non-monotonic. More precisely, the adoption of
modern technology takes place for intermediate levels of transport costs. To
understand this, note that for high transport costs the demand for trans-
portation is low, and for low transport costs the returns from transportation
are low (although demand is high).
We then observe that the shipper￿ s choice of transport technology is di-
rectly related to the service ￿rm￿ s mode of foreign expansion. First, the
modern technology will only be adopted if the service ￿rm enters the foreign
market (with either the export or FDI strategies), i.e.: when trade costs are
not extremely high. The reason for this is straightforward: only when trade
exchanges emerge in the economy is it worthy for the shipper to incur the
￿xed costs of the modern transport technology. Second, the modern tech-
nology is more likely to be adopted under FDI. The basis for this outcome is
that both the FDI strategy and the modern technology are more pro￿table
in larger markets and for intermediate levels of trade costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
discuss the available empirical evidence on the adoption of modern transport
technologies with the case study of the high-speed rail (HSR). In section 3,
5we introduce the base model. In section 4, we study the choice of foreign
expansion by the monopolist service ￿rm. In section 5, we analyze the choice
of transport technology by the shipper. In section 6, we conclude.
2 Case Study: The High-Speed Rail
To our knowledge there is very little empirical evidence on the adoption of
modern transport technologies. In order to ￿nd support for our theoretical
results we look, instead, to the pattern of development of the HSR in some
countries and regions of the world6. We base our analysis on a review on
the following HSR literature: Campos et al. (2007); Freemark (2009); Hood
(2006); Perren (1998), The Economist (2010) and The World Bank Railway
Database.
The HSR is a modern train technology, and as the name says the HSR
operates signi￿cantly faster than conventional trains7. The ￿rst HSR was
Japan￿ s Shinkansen, also known as the "bullet train", which started o¢ cially
operating in 1964 between Tokyo and Osaka. In the 1970￿ s, France began
to develop the French version of the bullet train, the TGV (Train ￿ Grande
Vitesse, literally high-speed rail). In 1981, France opened the ￿rst HSR
connection between Paris and Lyon. Since then, France￿ s HSR network has
been expanded to connect cities not only across France but also in adjacent
countries, in particular Belgium, Netherlands and England. In addition, the
European Union (EU) is currently ￿nancing a trans-European network of
high-speed rail that will link France￿ s TGV to other European countries,
such as Italy, Spain, Germany, Poland, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal8.
In the rest of this section, we will focus our analysis in four countries (Japan,
6This exercise, however, cannot enlighten us on how the choice of transport technology
interacts in the real world with the mode of foreign expansion by ￿rms. In our view, and
given the shortage of studies on the topic, this is an interesting issue for future research.
7A train connection is considered to be high speed if it runs 200 km/h (120 mph) for
upgraded tracks or 250 km/h (160 mph) or faster for new tracks. HSR is mostly used for
passenger transportation. However, in some cases is also used for goods transportation,
especially light goods, but also in some cases for bulk transportation (for instances the
French post uses HSR to transport mail).
8Even more ambitious is China￿ s plan for 50 000 kilometers (31 000 miles) of HSR lines
by 2020. This will make China the country in the world with the longest HSR system. In
turn, the US has a single HSR connection, the Acela Express, between Washington and
New York (passing by Baltimore and Philadelphia). The US has however plans to build a
new HSR line in California.
6France, Spain and Italy) and one region (Europe) with established HSR
networks. Our main conclusions do not change if we consider other countries
with HSR.
Anticipating the results from our small case study, we observe three pat-
terns related to the HSR adoption. First, the target areas for HSR connec-
tions are pairs of major cities. Second, economic integration can promote
the adoption of the HSR across countries. Third, the HSR tends to be built
between cities that are not too far apart or too close together9. As we will
see in the next sections, this is exactly what our model ￿nds. Next we seek
to provide evidence that supports our claims.
We start by analyzing the argument on population and HSR links. In
Japan, after the construction of the line between Tokyo and Osaka in 1964
(the ￿rst and third cities in Japan, respectively)10, Osaka-Hakata (Fukuoka)
followed in 1972, Tokyo-Hachinohe and ﬂ Omiya-Niigata in 1982, Takasaki-
Nagano in 1997 and Shin Yatsushiro-Kagoshima Chﬂ uﬂ o in 2004. Fukuoka
is the largest Japanese city west of Osaka. Hachinohe is the largest city
in the eastern Aomori prefecture. ﬂ Omiya is one of the hub stations in the
Greater Tokyo Area. Niigata has a population of approximately 800 000
(but the population of the Niigata prefecture is around 2.4 million) and
Kagoshima is located at the southwestern tip of the island of Japan with a
population of about 600 000. Takasaki, Nagano and Yatsushiro are smaller
cities. However, Takasaki functions as a regional transportation hub for
Japan￿ s Shinkansen. In turn, Nagano and Yatsushiro are intermediate stops
on the planned extension of the Osaka-Fukuoka line to the south and west
regions of Japan, respectively.
As already mentioned, in France the link between Paris and Lyon (￿rst
and second regional agglomerations in France) was completed in 1981. This
was followed by Paris-Tours-Le Mans in 1990, Lyon-Valence in 1992, Valence-
Marseille in 2001 and Paris-Strasbourg in 2007. While Tours and Le Mans are
not very large cities, they are part of the commuter belt of Paris11. In turn,
the Paris-Valence connection was developed as a step on the way to Marseille
(the third largest agglomeration in France). Strasbourg is only the seventh
largest city of France but it hosts several important European institutions
9In our model, the rate of transportation is proxied by distance.
10Yokohama is the second largest city in Japan but is part of the Greater Tokyo Area.
11In addition, the Paris-Tours-Le Mans link is planned to be extended to Bordeaux (the
famous wine region and also the eight-largest city in France with approximately 1 million
inhabitants) and to Spain as part of the trans-European HSR network.
7such as the Council of Europe, the Eurocorps, the European Parliament and
the European Union Ombudsman.
In Spain the main existing HSR connections are Madrid-Seville, opened
in 1992; Madrid-Valladolid in 2007 and Madrid-Barcelona in 2008. Madrid,
Seville, and Barcelona are respectively the ￿rst, fourth and second largest
cities in Spain. Valladolid is not a very large city (it has a population of just
320 000) but it is planned to be part of the HSR connection to the Basque
country (third largest region in Spain after Madrid and Catalonia) and to
Portugal12.
In turn, the aim of the Italian HSR network is two-fold: to connect
Naples-Rome-Florence-Bologna-Milan and Turin-Milan-Venice. The follow-
ing segments of these two lines are already in operation: Florence-Rome
opened in 1991, Rome-Naples in 2005, Milan-Bologna in 2008, Turin-Milan
and Bologna-Florence in 2009 (Milan-Venice is still under construction). Mi-
lan, Rome, Naples and Turin are the ￿rst, second, third and fourth largest
metropolitan areas in Italy, respectively. Florence, Venice and Bologna are
only in the second tier of the largest cities in Italy. However, Florence and
Venice are amongst the world￿ s top tourist cities and Bologna is a hub in
Italy￿ s train network. From the above, we can conclude that the countries
analyzed have prioritized HSR connections between larger cities.
We now turn to the second point related to economic integration. Eco-
nomic integration lowers the costs of exchanging goods across borders. It is a
well established fact that transport costs are higher at the international than
at the national level. For example, if two regions are equally distant from
each other, the trade costs tend to be higher when the two regions belong
to two di⁄erent countries than when they are part of the same country (see
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, 2004).
It can be easily noted that of all the regions in the world with HSR, only
in Europe were international connections established. As already mentioned,
the center of the trans-European HSR network has been France. The ￿rst
international HSR link in Europe was opened in 1993 between Paris and
Brussels and was shortly afterwards extended to Amsterdam13. In 1997 the
high speed line between Paris and London began operation with trains pass-
12A HSR connection to Valencia, Spain￿ s third largest city, is also under construction.
13Brussels is the de facto capital city of the EU and the largest urban area in Belgium
with around 1.8 million residents. The city of Amsterdam has a population of 1.36 million
and is the sixth-largest metropolitan area in Europe with around 6.7 million inhabitants.
8ing undersea through the famous purpose built Channel Tunnel14. Shortly
afterwards, Brussels was linked with Cologne in Germany15. Currently, con-
nections of the France￿ s HSR system to Spain (Madrid and Barcelona), Italy
(Turin and Milan), Switzerland (Zurich), and Germany (Frankfurt) are un-
der construction. In addition, other international links are being planned:
Netherlands with Germany, Austria with Germany, Italy with Germany,
Slovenia with Switzerland, Sweden with Denmark and Germany, Poland with
Germany, and Spain with Portugal.
Given that Europe constitutes the most developed experience of regional
economic integration (via the EU) in the world, this seems to con￿rm that
the adoption of modern technologies in transportation is facilitated by closer
economic integration.
We close by discussing the third argument on distance and HSR. Start
by noticing that if we compare HSR with other modes of transportation, like
air and road travel, we have the following. The HSR is less competitive than
air travel for longer distances (like Paris-Moscow), and more competitive for
journeys of up to two to three hours (250-900 kilometers or 150-550 miles)16.
In turn, the HSR is more competitive than road transportation for longer
distances, while the latter compares favorably for shorter distances, especially
when there is little congestion (i.e.: when road transportation occurs between
locations with a small market size).
In fact, and as we have mentioned, HSR tends to link cities within the
same country, where distances are usually smaller than between cities in
di⁄erent countries. Also, when international connections were established
(which, as we have seen, is only the case in Europe), the ￿rst lines opened
were amongst cities located at intermediate distance from each other. For
example, there is a HSR between Paris and Brussels situated 261 kilometers
apart (162 miles) but not between Paris and Berlin at a distance of 876
kilometers (544 miles), although Berlin is more populated than Brussels. In
this sense, we have that HSR networks tend to connect cities located at mid
14London is UK￿ s largest and most populous metropolitan area and the largest urban
zone in the European Union with about 14 million inhabitants.
15Cologne is Germany￿ s fourth-largest city, and one of the major European metropolitan
areas with around 10 million inhabitants.
16The reason for this is that not only are the formalities with checking-in and security less
time consuming with trains than with air travel, but train stations are also usually located
in city centers while airports are outside. Due to this, some air companies already include
a HSR ticket for a segment of the journey (for example, between Paris and Brussels).
9distance from each other, but not cities that are either too close or too far
apart17.
3 The Model
The model has two players: a monopolist service ￿rm (henceforth player
I) and a shipper (player S). The economy consists of two locations: the
monopolist headquarters and the foreign market with n consumers where all
￿nal demand is located. The monopolist has to choose whether or not to
supply the foreign market, and if it does, the monopolist has to decide the
mode of entry: by means of export or FDI. In turn, the shipper has to select
which transport technology to adopt: traditional or modern. Let f(p) be a
demand function (p is the delivered price), which we assume to be:
￿ Continuous
￿ Decreasing
￿ Revenue function pf(p) is strictly concave.
Remark 1 Together these assumptions imply that
dp
dc > 0 for all values of
c, where c stands for a constant marginal cost and p is a pro￿t maximizing
price.
To produce the ￿nal good, the monopolist needs an intermediate product
(training), which has to be produced in-house in the monopolist headquar-
ters. In turn, the ￿nal good (service) can either be produced in the mo-
nopolist￿ s headquarters or in a plant in the foreign market. In case of the
former, we say that the monopolist follows the export strategy, since the ￿nal
17The adoption of the railway in the nineteenth century apparently had a similar be-
havior to the one discussed above for the HSR (see O￿ Brien, 1983). We believe this is so
because when the railway started to be introduced it had similar characteristics to the
HSR nowadays. First, the railway was a new transport technology with high ￿xed costs
of adoption (the building of the rail network was usually in the hands of the railway com-
panies). Second, the railway was more adequate to connect cities that were not very far
away from each other. This was so, since the costs of introducing railway increased with
the distance. The adoption patterns of other technologies of transport, such as roadway
and air transportation, was however di⁄erent from both the HSR and railway, since the
technological characteristics of the former are di⁄erent from the latter. For instances, very
often the ￿xed costs of adopting the road and the air transport technologies are lower than
the railway (standard or high-speed), since the physical infrastructure (roads or airports)
are not built or owned by the transporting ￿rm.
10good is exported to the foreign market. In the latter case, the monopolist
pursues the FDI strategy, given that a production plant is established in the
destination market. In this sense, in the FDI strategy the ￿nal good is sold
directly to consumers, but the intermediate good needs to be exported in
order to be incorporated in the ￿nal good. We further assume that the price
of the intermediate good is w and that ￿rm I uses ￿ 2 [0;1] units of the
intermediate good to produce one unit of the consumer good.
As discussed in the introduction, we can think of the intermediate good as
￿rm-speci￿c knowledge assets (like blue-prints, patents and tacit knowledge)
that are required to be transmitted to the ￿rm￿ s employees in order for them
to be able to supply the ￿rm￿ s service to ￿nal consumers. We then have that
in the export strategy a ￿rm￿ s expert gives training to the ￿rms￿employees
in the headquarters. Subsequently, when a ￿rm sells a service, the trained
employees are exported to the foreign market to supply the service. In the
FDI strategy, instead, a ￿rm￿ s expert is exported to the foreign market in
order to give training to the ￿rm￿ s employees in the foreign subsidiary. These
employees, in turn, supply the service to consumers in the foreign market.
Export has over FDI the advantage of lower ￿xed costs. The expert that
gives training to the workers in the foreign city has to set up a local plant thus
incurring in costs related with indivisible assets that we express by the ￿xed
cost G. By contrast, FDI entails lower transport costs than Export: if m
denotes the unit variable cost of the ￿nal service good, the transport cost of
the intermediate good will be ￿m < m. This is so because the intermediate
good is a piece of information (as in Carr et al. 2001), so that it has the
nature of a public good inside the ￿rm. A single expert can jointly train
several workers in the foreign city. Thus, under FDI the travel of the expert
substitutes for the multiple travels the trainees would have to accomplish
were the training activity occur in the home city.
Intermediate production plays a central role in our model. To see this,
note that in the absence of the intermediate good, FDI and trade would be
substitutes (see Horstmann and Markusen, 1992). This is so, given that with
FDI all production designated for the destination market would be produced
locally, and therefore there would be no trade. In turn, with intermediate
production, FDI and trade can be complements. This is the case, since when
a ￿rm decides on the FDI strategy, the production plant in the foreign market
still needs to import the intermediate good to produce the ￿nal good. As
discussed in the introduction, although the data show that FDI and trade
tend to be complements, the standard framework in the theoretical horizontal
11FDI models assumes that FDI and trade are substitutes (Markusen, 2002).
With FDI and trade as potential complements, our set-up gains not only
in realism, but it also becomes more suitable for analyzing the topic we
propose to study. In fact, and as we have just seen, if FDI and trade are
substitutes it means that there is no trade under FDI, i.e.: the demand for
transportation would be zero with FDI. In this sense, the FDI decision would
become redundant for the choice of transport technology, i.e.: only with
exports would the shipper evaluate the alternative transport technologies
(traditional versus modern). On the other hand, with FDI and trade as
complements it means that there is trade under FDI (in our case, this is
due to trade in intermediate goods), i.e.: the demand for transportation is
positive with both export and FDI. Therefore, even when the service ￿rm
chooses FDI (and not only with exports), the shipper can ponder about what
is the pro￿t maximizing transport technology to serve the foreign market.
The game has two stages. In the ￿rst stage, the monopolist chooses
the mode of entry (exit, export or multinational) and the shipper decides
on transport technology (traditional or modern). In the second stage, the
monopolist sets a delivered price p.
We need to be more precise about the decision in the ￿rst stage. In what
concerns the monopolist, we have that it chooses between three alternative
ways to supply the foreign market:
￿ "0": Exit, I refrains from supplying the foreign market.
￿ "E": Export, I supplies the foreign market through exports.
￿ "D": FDI, I supplies the foreign market through a local plant.
As standard in the FDI literature (see Horstmann and Markusen, 1992),
we assume that it is more costly to operate a plant away from the headquar-
ters than close to it. This can be due to higher communication, transport or
knowledge transfer costs, which are usually higher when the plant is far away
from the headquarters. Without loss of generality, we then assume that the
plant-speci￿c ￿xed costs are zero in the case of exports and equal to G under
the FDI strategy.
The choice between the export and the FDI strategy can then be modeled






E(p;m) = n(p ￿ ￿w ￿ m)f(p)
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I
D(p;G;m) = n(p ￿ ￿w ￿ ￿m)f(p) ￿ G, (1)
Applying a positive linear transformation that consists in dividing the
payo⁄s by 1










c;m) = (p ￿ ￿w ￿ ￿m)f(p) ￿ G
c, (2)
where Gc = G
n are per capita plant-speci￿c ￿xed costs.
In turn, the shipper chooses between two transport technologies:
￿ A traditional technology "T" with positive variable costs and zero ￿xed
costs, whose pro￿t function is:
￿
S
T = (t ￿ m)Q, (3)
where t ￿ transport rate and Q ￿ demand for transport.
￿ A modern technology "M" with zero variable costs and a positive ￿xed
sunk cost F, whose pro￿t function is18:
￿
S
M = tQ ￿ F. (4)
In order to simplify, we assume that t = m (t is a parameter for both
players) because the monopolist ￿rm can always carry the product itself "on
foot" using the traditional technology.
Applying again a positive linear transformation that consists in dividing
the payo⁄s by 1
n, we have that the pro￿t functions for the traditional and









18In this sense, we can think of the modern technology as the HSR and the traditional
technology as the roadway. In fact, while the HSR is characterized by high ￿xed costs and
low marginal costs, the contrary is the case for the roadway (see Campos et al. 2007 and
Boylaud and Nicolett, 2001).
13Monopolist
Exit (0) Export (E) FDI (D)
Shipper Traditional 0,0 0,f(p)(p-aw-m) 0,f(p)(p-a(w-m))-GC
Modern -FC,0 f(p)m-FC, f(p)(p-aw-m) af(p)m-FC, f(p)(p-a(w-m))-GC
Figure 1: Payo⁄ matrix
where Qc =
Q
n are the per capita demand for transport and F c = F
n are
the per capita ￿xed costs of the modern technology.
Note then that demand for transportation under export and FDI is QE =
f(p) and QD = ￿f(p), respectively. This, together with the above, implies
that the ￿rst stage payo⁄ matrix is as in ￿gure 1.
We can now analyze in more detail the choices of the monopolist and the
shipper. We start with the monopolist and then move to the shipper.
4 Choice of the Mode of Foreign Expansion
From equations 1 and 2, we can see that the decision by the monopolist is
independent from the one by the shipper19. It is assumed that for each value
of m, the ￿rm selects a pro￿t-maximizing price. Then, in both cases E and















To analyze the decision between the strategies E and 0, note ￿rst that
￿I
E(m) is a continuous function and that:
19In the last section paper we discuss the consequence of relaxing this restriction in our
model. Remember however that the objective of this paper is to analyze how the mode
of foreign expansion by ￿rms, export versus foreign direct investment, accounts for the
selection of technologies of transport by shippers, modern versus traditional (and not how







E(m) < 0. (7)
Furthermore, function ￿I









= ￿f(p) < 0. (8)
Hence, there is a unique threshold ~ m, such that (see ￿gure 2):
￿
I
E(m) R 0 i⁄ m Q ~ m. (9)
In turn, the choice between strategies D and 0 can be analyzed by means




c;m) = 0. (10)
Using the implicit function theorem on ￿I
D(m;Gc), we ￿nd that every-












The Gc(m) function is then decreasing and convex (see ￿gure 2). It
can be concluded that Gc(0) is positive and ￿nite and lim
m!1￿I
D(Gc;m) < 0,




~ Gc; ~ m
￿
= 0 is positive, since the operating pro￿t of strategy D is positive
for m = ~ m. We then have:
f(p)(p ￿ ￿w ￿ ￿~ m) > ￿
I
E (~ m) = 0. (12)
Finally, the choice between strategies E and D can be examined through
the implicit function:
15H(G





c;m) = 0. (13)
Using again the implicit function theorem, we have that there is a con-
tinuous function Gc(m) that passes through the origin in space (Gc;m) and
through the point
￿
~ Gc; ~ m
￿







= (1 ￿ ￿)f(p) > 0
d2Gc





Gc(m) is thus increasing and concave (see ￿gure 2). Pulling together
the results obtained so far, we can plot the E, D and 0 regions in the space
(Gc;m). The di⁄erent areas in ￿gure 2 indicate where each strategy of serving
the consumers in the foreign market is more pro￿table for the monopolist
￿rm20.
From ￿gure 2, we can see that like in Horstmann and Markusen (1992)
the proximity-concentration also holds. In this sense, the export strategy is
preferred for high Gc (high economies of scale at the plant level and small
market size) and low m (low transport costs). The multinational strategy,
in turn, is favored for small Gc (low economies of scale at the plant level and
large market size) and mid-high m (medium-high transport costs). In the
next section, we will analyze the shipper￿ s choice of transport technology and
how this decision interacts with the mode of foreign expansion by the service
￿rm.
5 Choice of Transport Technology
The decision of the shipper depends upon the monopolist￿ s choice of foreign
expansion. In particular, as can be seen from ￿gure 1, the decision of the
shipper is:
￿ If Exit (0): Traditional (T)
20The thick dashed curve depicts the monopolist service ￿rm￿ s decision between the
strategies E-0. In turn, the thick solid curve for m < ~ m and m > ~ m represents the


















Figure 2: Location of the monopolist in space (Gc;m)
￿ If Export (E): Modern (M) i⁄ f (p)m ￿ F c ￿ 0; Traditional (T) i⁄
f (p)m ￿ F c < 0
￿ If FDI (D): Modern (M) i⁄ ￿f (p)m ￿ F c ￿ 0; Traditional (T) i⁄
￿f (p)m ￿ F c < 0
It is evident that the best reply by the shipper to exit (0) is the traditional
(T) transport technology, since the demand for transport services is then zero.
Therefore, the modern technology (M) can only be chosen in equilibrium if
the monopolist decides to supply the foreign market through exports (E) or
FDI (D).
De￿ne Qc
D ￿ per capita transport demand under FDI (with trade in
intermediate goods) and Qc




E = f (p(￿w + m))
Q
c
D = ￿f (p(￿(w + m))). (15)
Let ￿Qc = Qc
E￿Qc
D. Generally, ￿Qc has an indeterminate sign once ￿ <
1, as (p(￿w + m)) > (p(￿(w + m))) ) f (p(￿w + m)) < f (p(￿(w + m))).
17Without loss of generality assume that w = 0. The relation between LE (m) =
f (p(m))m and LD (m) = f (p(￿m))￿m is therefore undetermined.
In the export case, the following condition ensures both that the modern
technology is feasible for the shipper and that it is preferred to the traditional
one:
f(p(m))m ￿ F
c ￿ 0 (16)
or:
F
c ￿ LE(m) = f(p(m))m. (17)
Function LE(m) is de￿ned in [0; ~ m] for high enough values of Gc, so
that the monopolist chooses to supply the foreign market through exports.
According to the de￿nition of ~ m, function LE(m) has the following properties:
1. LE(0) = 0
















whose sign is ambiguous. However, since the derivative is continuous by
assumption, and
dLE
dm jm=0= 0, it follows that it is also positive for m in the
neighborhood of 0.
3. LE(~ m) = f(p(~ m))~ m = f(p(~ m))p(~ m) = ~ F c
E > 0.
In the FDI case, the condition for the adoption of the modern technology
is:
￿f (p(￿m))m ￿ F
c ￿ 0 (19)
or:
F
c ￿ LD (m) = ￿f (p(￿m))m. (20)
The function LD (m) has the following properties:
1. LD (0) = 0


















whose sign is ambiguous. However, since the derivative is continuous by
assumption, and
dLD
dm jm=0> 0, it follows that it is also positive for m in the
neighborhood of 0.
3. LD(~ m) = f(p(￿~ m))(￿~ m) = ~ F c
D > 0, since f(p(￿~ m)) > 0.
4. LD (m) is decreasing for arbitrary high values of m. This is so because:
(i) f(p(￿m)) ! 0 when m ! 1 (note that ￿m ! 1 when m ! 1 and
p(￿m) increases without bound with ￿m); (ii) ￿mf
0 (p)
dp
d(￿m) ! ￿1 when
m ! 1, once the assumptions on the demand function ensure that f
0 (p) < 0
and
dp
d(￿m) > 0 for all p.
The fact that LD (m) is eventually decreasing with the transport rate (m)
in the FDI region, together with the observation that the rise of m determines
a switch from FDI to exit, makes the adoption of the modern technology
less likely for high variable transport rates. This means that the increase
of the variable transport rate (proxied by distance) reduces the demand for
transport services, thus preventing the modern transport technology to break
even. In this sense, the adoption of modern transport technology tends to
occur in the vicinity of ~ m.
We then need to analyze the relations between:
~ F
c
E = LE (~ m) = f (p(~ m)) ~ m = f (p(~ m))p(~ m)
~ F
c
D = LD (~ m) = f (p(￿~ m))(￿~ m) < f (p(￿~ m))p(￿~ m)
~ G
c = (p(￿~ m) ￿ ￿~ m)f (p(￿~ m)). (22)
Start by looking at the total revenue function, pf (p). The total revenue
function is concave and has a unique maximum (see ￿gure 3). Then we
clearly see that the relations between ~ F c
E, ~ F c
D, and ~ Gc are undetermined.
We therefore need to examine how the equilibrium of the game changes
for di⁄erent relations between ~ F c
E, ~ F c
D, and ~ Gc. Six cases are possible:
19( ) 0 p
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Figure 3: Total revenue function
(1) ~ G
c > ~ F
c
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D > ~ F
c
E > ~ G
c. (23)
Figures 4 to 9 show the equilibrium choice of transport technology for
the cases in equation 23 as a function of the monopolist￿ s mode of foreign
expansion (exit, export, FDI)21. From ￿gures 4 to 9, we can observe three
patterns related to the choice of transport technology by the shipper alone
21In ￿gures 4 to 9, G = F, i.e.: the ￿xed costs of the monopolist equal the ￿xed costs of
the modern technology. We make this assumption in order to be able to make a graphical
representation of the equilibrium of the game. However, note that even so ~ Gc, ~ Fc
E and
~ Fc
D di⁄er. The LE (m) and LM (m) curves are signed with their respective names. The
LE (m) curve, though, is easy to identify since it is truncated for m > ~ m, i.e.: for m > ~ m
exports become prohibitive and therefore the demand for transportation is canceled. In
turn, from the properties of LD (m), we know that LD (m) is decreasing for arbitrary
20and two patterns that concern how the choice of the shipper interacts with
the decision on the mode of foreign expansion by the service ￿rm. Start with
the former. First, we have that as market size increases (low Gc and low F c)
the modern technology is promoted. Accordingly, larger market size allows
the shipper to explore the economies of scale of the modern technology.
Furthermore, the relation between market size and modern technology
adoption tends to be monotonic. There is, however, one exception: case (3),
where ~ F c
E > ~ Gc > ~ F c
D. When this occurs as market size increases, the modern
technology is only monotonically adopted in relation to the same mode of
foreign expansion, but not when export gives place to FDI, i.e.: (E;T) !
(E;M) ! (D;T) ! (D;M). Note however, that the non-monotonic relation
only arises for intermediate levels of m (lower than ~ m, but in its vicinity),
for lower and higher levels of m the relation is always monotonic, as it takes
place in the other cases (case (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6)). The reason for the
non monotonicity is that in case (3) there is a large di⁄erence between the
level of ￿xed costs that leads to the adoption of the modern technology under
exports and under FDI, i.e.: ~ F c
E >> ~ F c
D. This can occur for example when
trade in intermediate goods is small under FDI, and therefore the level of
￿xed costs that makes the modern technology pro￿table under FDI is also
low.
Second, decreasing transport costs (m) can encourage the adoption of the
modern technology. The rationale for this is that as trade costs decrease, the
demand for transportation increases, making the modern technology more
pro￿table than the traditional one. The previous result indicates that fur-
ther economic integration creates a good environment for the introduction of
modern transportation technologies.
Third, the relation between transport costs (as proxied by distance) and
the modern technology adoption is non-monotonic. In particular, as dis-
cussed above, the modern technology tends to be chosen by the shipper in
the vicinity of ~ m (i.e.: for intermediate levels of transport costs and in the
limits of the export strategy). For either high or low transport costs the
traditional technology is preferred. The reason for this is that with high
high values of m. In the ￿gures below, we have depicted that LD (m) starts to decrease
for m = ~ m. However, the results are not changed qualitatively if LD (m) is decreasing
only for m > ~ m. As in ￿gure 2, the thick dashed curve depicts the monopolist service
￿rm￿ s decision between the strategies E-0. The thick solid curves for m < ~ m and m > ~ m
represents the monopolist service ￿rm￿ s decision between the strategies D-E and D-0,
respectively.
21variable transport costs, demand for transportation is very low, and there-
fore the modern technology is not appealing for the shipper since economies
of scale in transportation are also low. In turn, for low trade costs (i.e.: over
short distance), while the demand for transportation is high, the returns from
transportation are so low that the shipper ￿nds it di¢ cult to pay the ￿xed
costs of the modern technology.
In terms of the relation between the choice of the service ￿rm and of the
shipper, we have the following. First, and as already mentioned above, if the
service ￿rm does not enter the market, then it is also not pro￿table for the
shipper to adopt the modern technology. This is so, since in this scenario,
there are no trade exchanges.
Second, the modern technology tends to arise together with the FDI
strategy. The reason for this is that both the modern technology and the
FDI strategy are more likely to emerge when market size is large and trade
costs intermediate. However, the modern transport technology can also oc-
cur jointly with the export strategy. This is only the case, though, when
~ F c
E > ~ Gc (￿gures 6, 7 and 9), i.e.: when the modern technology is pro￿table
for relatively high levels of ￿xed costs and the export strategy is pro￿table
for relatively low levels of plant-speci￿c ￿xed costs.
Given that the export strategy is relatively more intensive in transporta-
tion (since ￿ 2 [0;1]), it might seem a counter intuitive outcome that the
modern transport technology is more likely to arise when the service ￿rm
chooses the FDI strategy than with the export strategy (although, as we
have just seen the modern technology can also arises together with the ex-
port technology, see ￿gure 6, 7 and 9). In other words, we would expect
￿ priori that the modern technology would potentially be more attractive
under the export strategy than under the FDI strategy. However, this is
not the case, because in the end what is more important for the shipper￿ s
decision is not only the intensity of transportation under a given mode of
foreign expansion by the service ￿rm, but also the pro￿tability of a given
transport technology as determined by market size. And as we have just
seen, it comes out that when market size is large the decisions of the ship-
per and of the service ￿rm converge for the modern technology and the FDI
strategy, respectively.
In line with what we have discussed in the introduction, the development
of the HSR in several countries and regions of the world looks to con￿rm
our results related to adoption of the modern technology by the shipper
alone. We cannot, however, provide evidence for the assertions related to
22(0,T) (E,T)
(D,M)



























Figure 4: Transport technology in space ((Gc;F c);m): (1) ~ Gc > ~ F c
E > ~ F c
D
the interactions between the decisions of the shipper and the service ￿rm,
since in our case study we do not compare FDI and export data with the
introduction of the HSR. For analyzing the relations between the mode of
foreign expansion by ￿rms and the adoption of modern transport technologies
by shippers, we would need a fully ￿ edged econometric model with data
on exports and FDI. In our opinion this is an interesting topic for future
empirical research.
6 Discussion
In a set-up with intermediate production, we have analyzed how a shipper￿ s
choice of transport technology (traditional versus modern) is a⁄ected by the
mode of foreign expansion by a service ￿rm (export versus foreign direct
investment).
Concerning the choice of the service ￿rm, we derive the well known
proximity-concentration trade-o⁄augmented with trade in intermediate goods.
The last feature is central in our model because FDI and trade become com-
plements, and therefore we continue to have demand for transportation under





























Figure 5: Transport technology in space ((Gc;F c);m): (2) ~ Gc > ~ F c





























Figure 6: Transport technology in space ((Gc;F c);m): (3) ~ F c































Figure 7: Transport technology in space ((Gc;F c);m): (4) ~ F c
E > ~ F c


































Figure 8: Transport technology in space ((Gc;F c);m): (5) ~ F c
































Figure 9: Transport technology in space ((Gc;F c);m): (6) ~ F c
D > ~ F c
E > ~ Gc
FDI and trade as substitutes).
In what relates to the shipper￿ s choice of transport technology, we obtain
the following. First, the modern technology tends to be implemented in
larger markets, since the shipper can explore larger economies of scale in the
modern technology. Second, economic integration can help to promote the
adoption of the modern technology, given that it increases international trade
and therefore transport demand. Third, the adoption of modern technology
tends to arise for intermediate levels of variable transport costs (as proxied
by distance), since for high transport costs the demand for transportation is
low and for low transport costs the returns from transportation are small.
The above results seem to ￿t well with the adoption of modern trans-
port technologies, such as the HSR. In fact, we have observed that the HSR
tends to connect large cities that are not too far apart or too close together.
Furthermore, the European experience of closer economic integration has
triggered the adoption of HSR across European borders.
In turn, in terms of the interaction between the shipper￿ s choice of trans-
port technology and the service ￿rm￿ s mode of foreign expansion, we ￿nd
two main results. First, the modern technology is only adopted if the service
￿rm enters the market, since only then is there demand for transportation.
26Second, the adoption of modern technology tends to take place together with
the FDI strategy, once they both emerge for intermediate levels of trade costs
and when market size is large.
Given that we have not provided evidence to support the two previous
￿ndings, future empirical research could analyze the relation between the
adoption of modern transport technologies (such as the HSR) and the dom-
inant mode of foreign entry by ￿rms, such as export and FDI.
In addition, future work could extend our model to introduce competition
in the service sector, competition in the transport sector, and endogenize
the rate of transportation. Competition in the service sector in principle
will not change our main results since the proximity-concentration trade-
o⁄ still holds in duopoly and oligopoly market structures (see Markusen,
2002). Competition in the service sector, in turn, would only be relevant
with imperfect competition between transporting ￿rms (since with perfect
competition marginal cost pricing would hold). With imperfect competition
in the transport sector, we could also endogenize the rate of transportation.
In this way, the mode of foreign expansion in the service sector and the choice
of transport technology in the transport sector would be mutually dependent.
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